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Abstract
What is happiness for reinforcement learning agents? We seek a for-
mal definition satisfying a list of desiderata. Our proposed definition of
happiness is the temporal difference error, i.e. the difference between the
value of the obtained reward and observation and the agent’s expectation
of this value. This definition satisfies most of our desiderata and is com-
patible with empirical research on humans. We state several implications
and discuss examples.
Keywords. Temporal difference error, reward prediction error, pleasure, well-
being, optimism, machine ethics
1 Introduction
People are constantly in search of better ways to be happy. However, philoso-
phers and psychologists have not yet agreed on a notion of human happiness. In
this paper, we pursue the more general goal of defining happiness for intelligent
agents. We focus on the reinforcement learning (RL) setting [SB98] because it is
an intensively studied formal framework which makes it easier to make precise
statements. Moreover, reinforcement learning has been used to model behaviour
in both human and non-human animals [Niv09].
Here, we decouple the discussion of happiness from the discussion of con-
sciousness, experience, or qualia. We completely disregard whether happiness
is actually consciously experienced or what this means. The problem of con-
sciousness has to be solved separately; but its answer might matter insofar that
it could tell us which agents’ happiness we should care about.
Desiderata. We can simply ask a human how happy they are. But artificial
reinforcement learning agents cannot yet speak. Therefore we use our human
“common sense” intuitions about happiness to come up with a definition. We
arrive at the following desired properties.
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• Scaling. Happiness should be invariant under scaling of the rewards. Re-
placing every reward rt by crt+d for some c, d ∈ R with c > 0 (independent
of t) does not change the reinforcement learning problem in any relevant
way. Therefore we desire a happiness measure to be independent under
rescaling of the rewards.
• Subjectivity. Happiness is a subjective property of the agent depending
only on information available to the agent. For example, it cannot depend
on the true environment.
• Commensurability. The happiness of different agents should be compara-
ble. If at some time step an agent A has happiness x, and another agent
B has happiness y, then it should be possible to tell whether A is happier
than B by computing x− y. This could be relaxed by instead asking that
A can calculate the happiness of B according to A’s subjective beliefs.
• Agreement. The happiness function should match experimental data about
human happiness.
It has to be emphasised that in humans, happiness cannot be equated with
pleasure [RSDD14]. In the reinforcement learning setting, pleasure corresponds
to the reward. Therefore happiness and reward have to be distinguished. We
crudely summarise this as follows; for a more detailed discussion see Section 3.
pleasure = reward 6= happiness
The happiness measure that we propose is the following. An agent’s happiness
in a time step t is the difference between the value of the obtained reward
and observation and the agent’s expectation of this value at time step t. In
the Markov setting, this is also known as the temporal difference error (TD
error) [SB90]. However, we do not limit ourselves to the Markov setting in this
paper. In parts of the mammalian brain, the neuromodulator dopamine has a
strong connection to the TD error [Niv09]. Note that while our definition of
happiness is not equal to reward it remains highly correlated to the reward,
especially if the expectation of the reward is close to 0.
Our definition of happiness coincides with the definition for joy given by Ja-
cobs et al. [JBJ14], except that the latter is weighted by 1 minus the (objective)
probability of taking the transition which violates subjectivity. Schmidhuber’s
work on ‘intrinsic motivation’ adds a related component to the reward in order
to motivate the agent to explore in interesting directions [Sch10].
Our definition of happiness can be split into two parts. (1) The difference
between the instantaneous reward and its expectation, which we call payout,
and (2) how the latest observation and reward changes the agent’s estimate of
future rewards, which we call good news. Moreover, we identify two sources of
happiness: luck, favourable chance outcomes (e.g. rolling a six on a fair die),
and pessimism, having low expectations of the environment (e.g. expecting a
fair die to be biased against you). We show that agents that know the world
perfectly have zero expected happiness. Proofs can be found in Appendix A.
In the rest of the paper, we use our definition as a starting point to investigate
the following questions. Is an off-policy agent happier than an on-policy one?
Do monotonically increasing rewards necessarily imply a happy agent? How
does value function initialisation affect the happiness of an agent? Can we
construct an agent that maximises its own happiness?
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2 Reinforcement Learning
In reinforcement learning (RL) an agent interacts with an environment in cycles:
at time step t the agent chooses an action at ∈ A and receives an observation
ot ∈ O and a real-valued reward rt ∈ R; the cycle then repeats for time step
t + 1 [SB98]. The list of interactions a1o1r1a2o2r2 . . . is called a history. We
use ht to denote a history of length t, and we use the shorthand notation h :=
ht−1 and h′ := ht−1atotrt. The agent’s goal is to choose actions to maximise
cumulative rewards. To avoid infinite sums, we use a discount factor γ with
0 < γ < 1 and maximise the discounted sum
∑∞
t=1 γ
trt. A policy is a function
pi mapping every history to the action taken after seeing this history, and an
environment µ is a stochastic mapping from histories to observation-reward-
tuples.
A policy pi together with an environment µ yields a probability distribution
over histories. Given a random variable X over histories, we write the pi-µ-
expectation of X conditional on the history h as Epiµ[X | h].
The (true) value function V piµ of a policy pi in environment µ maps a history
ht to the expected total future reward when interacting with environment µ and
taking actions according to the policy pi:
V piµ (ht) := Epiµ
[∑∞
k=t+1 γ
k−t−1rk | ht
]
. (1)
It is important to emphasise that Epiµ denotes the objective expectation that can
be calculated only by knowing the environment µ. The optimal value function
V ∗µ is defined as the value function of the optimal policy, V
∗
µ (h) := suppi V
pi
µ (h).
Typically, reinforcement learners do not know the environment and are try-
ing to learn it. We model this by assuming that at every time step the agent
has (explicitly or implicitly) an estimate Vˆ of the value function V piµ . Formally,
a value function estimator maps a history h to a value function estimate Vˆ .
Finally, we define an agent to be a policy together with a value function esti-
mator. If the history is clear from context, we refer to the output of the value
function estimator as the agent’s estimated value.
If µ only depends on the last observation and action, µ is called Markov deci-
sion process (MDP). In this case, µ(otrt | ht−1at) = µ(otrt | ot−1at) and the ob-
servations are called states (st = ot). In MDPs we use the Q-value function, the
value of a state-action pair, defined asQpiµ(st, at) := Epiµ
[∑∞
k=t+1 γ
k−t−1rk | stat
]
.
Assuming that the environment is an MDP is very common in the RL literature,
but here we will not make this assumption.
3 A Formal Definition of Happiness
The goal of a reinforcement learning agent is to maximise rewards, so it seems
natural to suppose an agent is happier the more rewards it gets. But this does
not conform to our intuition: sometimes enjoying pleasures just fails to provide
happiness, and reversely, enduring suffering does not necessarily entail unhap-
piness (see Example 3 and Example 7). In fact, it has been shown empirically
that rewards and happiness cannot be equated [RSDD14] (p-value < 0.0001).
There is also a formal problem with defining happiness in terms of reward: we
can add a constant c ∈ R to every reward. No matter how the agent-environment
interaction plays out, the agent will have received additional cumulative rewards
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C :=
∑t
i=1 c. However, this did not change the structure of the reinforcement
learning problem in any way. Actions that were optimal before are still optimal
and actions that are slightly suboptimal are still slightly suboptimal to the same
degree. For the agent, no essential difference between the original reinforcement
learning problem and the new problem can be detected: in a sense the two
problems are isomorphic. If we were to define an agent’s happiness as received
reward, then an agent’s happiness would vary wildly when we add a constant
to the reward while the problem stays structurally exactly the same.
We propose the following definition of happiness.
Definition 1 (Happiness). The happiness of a reinforcement learning agent
with estimated value Vˆ at time step t with history hat while receiving observa-
tion ot and reward rt is
,(hatotrt, Vˆ ) := rt + γVˆ (hatotrt)− Vˆ (h). (2)
If ,(h′, Vˆ ) is positive, we say the agent is happy, and if ,(h′, Vˆ ) is negative, we
say the agent is unhappy.
It is important to emphasise that Vˆ represents the agent’s subjective estimate
of the value function. If the agent is good at learning, this might converge to
something close to the true value function V piµ . In an MDP (2) is also known as
the temporal difference error [SB90]. This number is used used to update the
value function, and thus plays an integral part in learning.
If there exists a probability distribution ρ on histories such that the value
function estimate Vˆ is given by the expected future discounted rewards accord-
ing to the probability distribution ρ,
Vˆ (h) = Epiρ
[∑∞
k=t+1 γ
k−t−1rk | h
]
, (3)
then we call E := Epiρ the agent’s subjective expectation. Note that we can always
find such a probability distribution, but this notion only really makes sense for
model-based agents (agents that learn a model of their environment). Using the
agent’s subjective expectation, we can rewrite Definition 1 as follows.
Proposition 2 (Happiness as Subjective Expectation). Let E denote an agent’s
subjective expectation. Then
,(h′, Vˆ ) = rt − E[rt | h] + γ (Vˆ (h′)− E[Vˆ (haor) | h]) . (4)
Proposition 2 states that happiness is given by the difference of how good
the agent thought it was doing and what it learns about how well it actually
does. We distinguish the following two components in (4):
• Payout: the difference of the obtained reward rt and the agent’s expecta-
tion of that reward E[rt | h].
• Good News: the change in opinion of the expected future rewards after
receiving the new information otrt.
,(h′, Vˆ ) = rt − E[rt | h]︸ ︷︷ ︸
payout
+γ
(
Vˆ (h′)− E[Vˆ (haor) | h]︸ ︷︷ ︸
good news
)
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Example 3. Mary is travelling on an air plane. She knows that air planes crash
very rarely, and so is completely at ease. Unfortunately she is flying on a budget
airline, so she has to pay for her food and drink. A flight attendant comes to her
seat and gives her a free beverage. Just as she starts drinking it, the intercom
informs everyone that the engines have failed. Mary feels some happiness from
the free drink (payout), but her expected future reward is much lower than in
the state before learning the bad news. Thus overall, Mary is unhappy.
For each of the two components, payout and good news, we distinguish the
following two sources of happiness.
• Pessimism:1 the agent expects the environment to contain less rewards
than it actually does.
• Luck: the outcome of rt is unusually high due to randomness.
rt − E[rt | h] = rt − Epiµ[rt | h]︸ ︷︷ ︸
luck
+Epiµ[rt | h]− E[rt | h]︸ ︷︷ ︸
pessimism
Vˆ (h′)− E[Vˆ (haor) | h] = Vˆ (h′)− Epiµ[Vˆ (haor) | h]︸ ︷︷ ︸
luck
+ Epiµ[Vˆ (haor) | h]− E[Vˆ (haor) | h]︸ ︷︷ ︸
pessimism
Example 4. Suppose Mary fears flying and expected the plane to crash (pes-
simism). On hearing that the engines failed (bad luck), Mary does not experi-
ence very much change in her future expected reward. Thus she is happy that
she (at least) got a free drink.
The following proposition states that once an agent has learned the envi-
ronment, its expected happiness is zero. In this case, underestimation cannot
contribute to happiness and thus the only source of happiness is luck, which
cancels out in expectation.
Proposition 5 (Happiness of Informed Agents). An agent that knows the world
has an expected happiness of zero: for every policy pi and every history h,
Epiµ[,(h′, V piµ ) | h] = 0.
Analogously, if the environment is deterministic, then luck cannot be a source
of happiness. In this case, happiness reduces to how much the agent underes-
timates the environment. By Proposition 5, having learned a deterministic
environment perfectly, the agent’s happiness is equal to zero.
4 Matching the Desiderata
Here we discuss in which sense our definition of happiness satisfies the desiderata
from Section 1.
1Optimism is a standard term in the RL literature to denote the opposite phenomenon.
However, this notion is somewhat in discord with optimism in humans.
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Scaling. If we transform the rewards to r′t = crt + d with c > 0, d ∈ R
for each time step t without changing the value function, the value of , will
be completely different. However, a sensible learning algorithm should be able
to adapt to the new reinforcement learning problem with the scaled rewards
without too much problem. At that point, the value function gets scaled as
well, Vnew(h) = cV (h) + d/(1− γ). In this case we get
,(hatotr′, Vnew) = r′t + γVnew(hatotr′t)− Vnew(h)
= crt + d+ γcV (hatotr
′
t) + γ
d
1− γ − cV (h)−
d
1− γ
= c
(
rt + γV (hatotr
′
t)− V (h)
)
,
hence happiness gets scaled by a positive factor and thus its sign remains the
same, which would not hold if we defined happiness just in terms of rewards.
Subjectivity. The definition (4) of , depends only on the current reward and
the agent’s current estimation of the value function, both of which are available
to the agent.
Commensurability. The scaling property as described above means that the
exact value of the happiness is not useful in comparing two agents, but the sign
of the total happiness can at least tell us whether a given agent is happy or
unhappy. Arguably, failing this desideratum is not surprising; in utility theory
the utilities/rewards of different agents are typically not commensurable either.
However, given two agents A and B, A can still calculate the A-subjective
happiness of a history experienced by B as ,(haorB , Vˆ A). This corresponds to
the human intuition of “putting yourself in someone else’s shoes”. If both agents
are acting in the same environment, the resulting numbers should be commen-
surable, since the calculation is done using the same value function. It is entirely
possible that A believes B to be happier, i.e. ,(haorB , Vˆ A) > ,(haorA, Vˆ A),
but also that B believes A to be happier ,(haorA, Vˆ B) > ,(haorB , Vˆ B), be-
cause they have different expectations of the environment.
Agreement. Rutledge et al. measure subjective well-being on a smartphone-
based experiment with 18,420 participants [RSDD14]. In the experiment, a
subject goes through 30 trials in each of which they can choose between a sure
reward and a gamble that is resolved within a short delay. Every two to three
trials the subjects are asked to indicate their momentary happiness.
Our model based on Proposition 2 with a very simple learning algorithm
and no loss aversion correlates fairly well with reported happiness (mean r =
0.56, median r2 = 0.41, median R2 = 0.27) while fitting individual discount
factors, comparative to Rutledge et al.’s model (mean r = 0.60, median r2 =
0.47, median R2 = 0.36) and a happiness=cumulative reward model (mean
r = 0.59, median r2 = 0.46, median R2 = 0.35). This analysis is inconclusive,
but unsurprisingly so: the expected reward is close to 0 and thus our happiness
model correlates well with rewards. See Appendix B for the details of our data
analysis.
The hedonic treadmill [BC71] refers to the idea that humans return to a
baseline level of happiness after significant negative or positive events. Stud-
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ies have looked at lottery winners and accident victims [BCJB78], and peo-
ple dealing with paralysis, marriage, divorce, having children and other life
changes [DLS06]. In most cases these studies have observed a return to base-
line happiness after some period of time has passed; people learn to make cor-
rect reward predictions again. Hence their expected happiness returns to zero
(Proposition 5). Our definition unfortunately does not explain why people have
different baseline levels of happiness (or hedonic set points), but these may be
perhaps explained by biological means (different humans have different levels
of neuromodulators, neurotransmitters, hormones, etc.) which may move their
baseline happiness. Alternatively, people might simply learn to associate differ-
ent levels of happiness with “feeling happy” according to their environment.
5 Discussion and Examples
5.1 Off-policy Agents
In reinforcement learning, we are mostly interested in learning the value function
of the optimal policy. A common difference between RL algorithms is whether
they learn off-policy or on-policy. An on-policy agent evaluates the value of the
policy it is currently following. For example, the policy that the agent is made
to follow could be an ε-greedy policy, where the agent picks arg maxaQ
pi(h, a)
a fraction (1− ε) of the time, and a random action otherwise. If ε is decreased
to zero over time, then the agent’s learned policy tends to the optimal policy in
MDPs. Alternatively, an agent can learn off-policy, that is it can learn about
one policy (say, the optimal one) while following a different behaviour policy.
The behaviour policy (pib) determines how the agent acts while it is learning
the optimal policy. Once an off-policy learning agent has learned the optimal
value function V ∗µ , then it is not happy if it still acts according to some other
(possibly suboptimal) policy.
Proposition 6 (Happiness of Off-Policy Learning). Let pi be some policy and
µ be some environment. Then for any history h
Epiµ[,(h′, V ∗µ ) | h] ≤ 0.
Q-learning is an example of an off-policy algorithm in the MDP setting. If
Q-learning converges, and the agent is still following the sub-optimal behaviour
policy then Proposition 6 tells us that the agent will be unhappy. Moreover, this
means that SARSA (an on-policy RL algorithm) will be happier than Q-learning
on average and in expectation.
5.2 Increasing and Decreasing Rewards
Intuitively, it seems that if things are constantly getting better, this should
increase happiness. However, this is not generally the case: even an agent that
obtains monotonically increasing rewards can be unhappy if it thinks that these
rewards mean even higher negative rewards in the future.
Example 7. Alice has signed up for a questionable drug trial which examines
the effects of a potentially harmful drug. This drug causes temporary pleasure to
the user every time it is used, and increased usage results in increased pleasure.
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β : −1
α : 0 α : 2
Figure 1: MDP of Example 8 with
transitions labelled with actions α or
β and rewards. We use the discount
factor γ = 0.5. The agent starts in s0.
Define pi0(s0) := α, then V
pi0(s0) = 0.
The optimal policy is pi∗(s0) = β, so
V pi
∗
(s0) = 1 and V
pi∗(s1) = 4.
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Figure 2: A plot of happiness for
Example 8. We use the learning
rate α = 0.1. The pessimistic agent
has zero happiness (and rewards),
whereas the optimistic agent is ini-
tially unhappy, but once it transitions
to state s1 becomes happy. The plot
also shows the rewards of the opti-
mistic agent.
However, the drug reduces quality of life in the long term. Alice has been
informed of the potential side-effects of the drug. She can be either part of a
placebo group or the group given the drug. Every morning Alice is given an
injection of an unknown liquid. She finds herself feeling temporary but intense
feelings of pleasure. This is evidence that she is in the non-placebo group, and
thus has a potentially reduced quality of life in the long term. Even though she
experiences pleasure (increasing rewards) it is evidence of very bad news and
thus she is unhappy.
Analogously, decreasing rewards do not generally imply unhappiness. For
example, the pains of hard labour can mean happiness if one expects to harvest
the fruits of this labour in the future.
5.3 Value Function Initialisation
Example 8 (Increasing Pessimism Does Not Increase Happiness). Consider the
deterministic MDP example in Figure 1. Assume that the agent has an initial
value function Qˆ0(s0, α) = 0, Qˆ0(s0, β) = −ε, Qˆ0(s1, α) = ε and Qˆ0(s1, β) =
0. If no forced exploration is carried out by the agent, it has no incentive
to visit s1. The happiness achieved by such an agent for some time step t is,(s0αs00, Vˆ0) = 0 where Vˆ0(s0) := Qˆ0(s0, α) = 0. However, suppose the agent is
(more optimistically) initialised with Qˆ0(s0, α) = 0, Qˆ0(s0, β) = ε. In this case,
the agent would take action β and arrive in state s1. This transition would
have happiness ,(s0βs1−1, Vˆ0) = −1 + γQˆ0(s1, α) − Qˆ0(s0, β) = −1 − 0.5ε.
However, the next transition is s1αs12 which has happiness ,(s1αs12, Vˆ0) =
2 + γQˆ0(s1, α) − Qˆ0(s1, α) = 2 − 0.5ε. If Qˆ0 is not updated by some learning
mechanism the agent will continue to accrue this positive happiness for all future
time steps. If the agent does learn, it will still be some time steps before Qˆ
converges to Q∗ and the positive happiness becomes zero (see Figure 2). It
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is arguable whether this agent which suffered one time step of unhappiness
but potentially many time steps of happiness is overall a happier agent, but it is
some evidence that absolute pessimism does not necessarily lead to the happiest
agents.
5.4 Maximising Happiness
How can an agent increase their own happiness? The first source of happi-
ness, luck, depends entirely on the outcome of a random event that the agent
has no control over. However, the agent could modify its learning algorithm
to be systematically pessimistic about the environment. For example, when
fixing the value function estimation below rmin/(1− γ) for all histories, happi-
ness is positive at every time step. But this agent would not actually take any
sensible actions. Just as optimism is commonly used to artificially increase ex-
ploration, pessimism discourages exploration which leads to poor performance.
As demonstrated in Example 8, a pessimistic agent may be less happy than a
more optimistic one.
Additionally, an agent that explicitly tries to maximise its own happiness
is no longer a reinforcement learner. So instead of asking how an agent can
increase its own happiness, we should fix a reinforcement learning algorithm
and ask for the environment that would make this algorithm happy.
6 Conclusion
An artificial superintelligence might contain subroutines that are capable of
suffering, a phenomenon that Bostrom calls mind crime [Bos14, Ch. 8]. More
generally, Tomasik argues that even current reinforcement learning agents could
have moral weight [Tom14]. If this is the case, then a general theory of happi-
ness for reinforcement learners is essential; it would enable us to derive ethical
standards in the treatment of algorithms. Our theory is very preliminary and
should be thought of as a small step in this direction. Many questions are left
unanswered, and we hope to see more research on the suffering of AI agents in
the future.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.
,(h′, Vˆ ) = rt + γVˆ (h′)− Vˆ (h)
= rt + γVˆ (h
′)− E
[ ∞∑
k=t
γk−trk | h
]
= rt − E[rt | h] + γVˆ (h′)− E
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
γk−trk | h
]
= rt − E[rt | h] + γVˆ (h′)− γE
[
E
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
γk−t−1rk | haor
]
| h
]
= rt − E[rt | h] + γVˆ (h′)− γE
[
Vˆ (haor) | h
]
,
where the second to last equality uses the tower property for conditional expec-
tations.
Proof of Proposition 5. For the true value function V piµ , a subjective expectation
exists by definition since (3) is the same as (1). Hence we can apply Proposi-
tion 2:
Epiµ[,(h′, V piµ ) | h]
= Epiµ[rt − Epiµ[rt | h] + γV piµ (h′)− γEpiµ[V piµ (haor) | h] | h]
= Epiµ[rt | h]− Epiµ[Epiµ[rt | h] | h] + γEpiµ[V piµ (h′) | h]− γEpiµ[Epiµ[V piµ (haor) | h] | h]
= Epiµ[rt | h]− Epiµ[rt | h] + γEpiµ[V piµ (h′) | h]− γEpiµ[V piµ (haor) | h] = 0
Proof of Proposition 6. Let h′ be any history of length t, and let pi∗ denote
an optimal policy for environment µ, i.e., V ∗µ = V
pi∗
µ . In this case, we have
V ∗µ (h) ≥ V ∗µ (hpi(h)), and hence
Epi
∗
µ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γk−trk | h
]
≥ Epi∗µ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γk−trk | hpi(h)
]
. (5)
We use this in the following:
Epiµ[,(h′, V ∗µ ) | h]
= Epiµ[rt + γV ∗µ (h′)− V ∗µ (h) | h]
= Epiµ
[
rt + γEpi
∗
µ
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
γk−t−1rk | h′
]
− Epi∗µ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γk−trk | h
]
| h
]
(5)
≤ Epiµ
[
rt + Epi
∗
µ
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
γk−trk | h′
]
− Epi∗µ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γk−trk | hat
]
| h
]
= Epiµ
[
rt − Epi∗µ [rt | hat]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
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+ Epi
∗
µ
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
γk−trk | h′
]
− Epi∗µ
[ ∞∑
k=t+1
γk−trk | hat
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
| h
]
since Epiµ[Epi
∗
µ [X | hatotrt] | h] = Epiµ[Epi
∗
µ [X | hat] | h] because conditional on
hat, the distribution of ot and rt is independent of the policy.
B Data Analysis
In this section we describe the details of the data analysis on the Great Brain
Experiment2 conducted by Rutledge et al. [RSDD14]. This experiment mea-
sures subjective well-being on a smartphone app and had 18,420 subjects. Each
subject goes through 30 trials and starts with 500 points. At the start of a trial,
the subject is given an option to choose between a certain reward (CR) and a
50–50 gamble between two outcomes. The gamble is pictorially shown to have
an equal probability between the outcomes, thus making it easy for the subject
to choose between the certain reward and the gamble.
Before the trials start the agent is asked to rate their current happiness on
a scale of 0-100. The slider for the scale is initialised randomly. Every two to
three trials and 12 times in each play the subject is asked the question “How
happy are you at this moment?”
We model this experiment as a reinforcement learning problem with 150
different states representing the different trials that the subject can see (the
possible combinations of certain rewards and gamble outcomes), and two actions
certain and gamble. For example, in a trial the subject could be presented
with the choice between a certain reward of 30 and a 50–50 gamble between 0
and 72.
The expected reward after each state is uniquely determined by the state’s
description, but the agent has subjective uncertainty about the value of the
state, since it does not know which states (types of trials) will follow the current
one or how these states are distributed. (In the experiment, the a priori expected
outcome of a trial (the average value of the states) was 5.5 points, and the
maximum gain or loss in a single trial is 220 points.) Furthermore, the subject
might incorrectly estimate the value of the gamble: although the visualisation
correctly suggests that each of the two outcomes is equally likely, the subject
might be uncertain about this, or simply compute the average incorrectly.
Rutledge et al. model happiness as an affine-linear combination of the certain
reward (CR), the expected value of the gamble (EV) and the reward prediction
error at the outcome of the gamble (RPE). The weights for this affine-linear
combination were learned through linear regression on fMRI data from another
similar experiment on humans (wCR = 0.52, wEV = 0.35, and wRPE = 0.8 for
z-scored happiness ratings).
The data was kindly provided to us by Rutledge. We disregard the first
happiness rating that occurs before the first trial. Moreover, we removed all 762
subjects whose happiness ratings (other than the first) had a standard deviation
of 0.
2http://www.thegreatbrainexperiment.com/
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Figure 3: Distribution of the discount factor γ (for happiness aggregation and
rewards) fit per subject (N = 17658). The plot for Rutledge et al.’s model looks
similar.
To test our happiness definition on the data, we have to model how humans
estimate the value of a history. We chose a very simple model where a subject’s
expectation before each trial is the average of the previous outcomes. We use the
empirical distribution function, that estimates all future rewards as the average
outcome so far:
ρ(rn | h) := #{k ≤ t | rk = rn}
t
for n > t.
With Equation 3, this gives a value function estimate of Vˆ (a1o1r1 . . . atotrt) =
1
t(1−γ)
∑t
i=1 ri.
We assume that the subject typically computes the expected value of the
trial correctly, i.e. E[rt | h] := max{CR,EV}. We calculate happiness at time t
with the formula from Proposition 2.
Since subjects’ happiness ratings are not given on every trial, we use geo-
metric discounting with discount factor γ to aggregate happiness from previous
trials:
predicted happiness :=
t∑
k=1
γt−k,(hk, Vˆk),
where hk is the history at time step k and Vˆk is the value function estimate at
time step k. For each subject, we optimise γ such that the Pearson correlation
r is maximised. The result is that the majority of subjects use a γ of either
very close to 0 or very close to 1 (see Figure 3). A possible explanation of this
phenomenon could be that it is unclear to the human subjects whether they are
to indicate their instantaneous or their cumulative happiness.
We use the sample Pearson correlation r, its square r2 and the coefficient of
determination R2 to evaluate each model. For n data points (in our case n = 11,
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Figure 4: The distribution of the
correlation coefficients for our happi-
ness model (N = 17658).
Figure 5: The distribution of the
correlation coefficients for Rutledge
et al.’s model (N = 17658).
the number of happiness ratings per subject), the sample Pearson correlation r
is defined as
r = rxy =
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)2
where x¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi is the sample mean. The coefficient of determination R
2
on n data points with (training) data x ∈ X and predictions y ∈ Y is
R2 = 1−
∑n
i=1(yi − xi)2∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
We calculate R2 only on z-scored terms; z-scoring does not affect r.
Our model’s predicted happiness correlates fairly well with reported happi-
ness (mean r = 0.56, median r2 = 0.41, median R2 = 0.27) while fitting indi-
vidual discount factors, comparative to Rutledge et al.’s model (mean r = 0.60,
median r2 = 0.47, median R2 = 0.36) and a happiness=cumulative reward
model (mean r = 0.59, median r2 = 0.46, median R2 = 0.35). So this analysis
is inconclusive. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the distribution of the correlation
coefficients. We emphasise that our model was derived a priori and then tested
on the data, while their model has three parameters (weights for CR, EV, and
RPE) that were fitted on data from humans using linear regression.
It is well known that humans do not value rewards linearly. In particular,
people appear to weigh losses more heavily than gains, an effect known as loss
aversion. To model this, we set
reward :=
{
outcomeα if outcome > 0
−λ · (−outcome)β otherwise.
Using parameters found by Rutledge et al. (mean λ = 1.7, mean α = 1.05, mean
β = 1.01) we also get a slightly improved agreement (mean r = 0.60, median
r2 = 0.48, median R2 = 0.39). Table 1 lists these results.
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Model γ r med r2 R2 med R2
normal 0.52± 0.34 0.56± 0.30 0.41 0.12± 0.61 0.27
loss aversion 0.53± 0.34 0.60± 0.31 0.48 0.20± 0.61 0.39
Rutledge et al. 0.55± 0.35 0.60± 0.30 0.47 0.19± 0.60 0.36
pleasure 0.55± 0.35 0.59± 0.30 0.46 0.18± 0.60 0.35
Table 1: Discount factor γ, correlation coefficient r, and goodness-of-fit mea-
sure R2 for various versions of our model, compared to Rutledge et al. and a
happiness=pleasure model (N = 17658).
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